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Abstract
Two pension reforms in Austria increased the early retirement age from 60 to 62 for
men and from 55 to 58.25 for women. The reforms reduced early retirement by 18.9
percentage points among affected men aged 60-62 and by 22.3 percentage points among
affected women aged 55-58.25. The associated increase in employment was merely 6.8
percentage points among men and 10.1 percentage points among women. The reforms
had large spillover effects to the unemployment insurance program but negligible effects
on disability insurance claims. Specifically, unemployment increased by roughly 10
percentage points both among men and women. Spillover effects had substantial fiscal
implications. Absent spillover effects, the reduction of net government expenditures
would have amounted to 264 million Euros per year. Due to higher unemployment
insurance claims and associated foregone income tax revenues the actual reduction was
only 148 million Euros. High-wage and healthy workers carried the bulk of the fall in
net government expenditures. Low-wage and less healthy workers generated much less
government savings as they either continue to retire early via disability pensions or
bridge the gap to regular retirement by drawing unemployment benefits.
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1 Introduction
Aging populations put enormous pressure on public pension systems.1 These financial pres-
sures are further enhanced by low and decreasing labor force participation rates of older in-
dividuals. As a consequence, many countries are considering (or have already implemented)
pension reforms that cut retirement benefits and/or increase the statutory retirement age.2
Policy reforms that increase the statutory retirement age are difficult to implement for
two main reasons. A first objection holds that, increasing the statutory retirement age is not
an effective policy instrument, because the employment opportunities of older workers are
weak. Increasing the retirement age is therefore unlikely to increase employment of older
workers. Instead, it will increase unemployment benefit and disability benefit payrolls.
Second, increasing the statutory retirement age is unfair because it mainly restricts the
opportunity set of workers with the weakest labor market position while leaving unaffected
workers whose labor market conditions are more favorable. Put differently, the less healthy
workers in low-paid jobs (who have the highest incentive to retire) are hurt while the
retirement age is much less binding for workers in good health in well-paid jobs.
In this paper we shed new light on these controversial issues by studying the impact of
the Austrian pensions reforms of the years 2000 and 2003 that increased the early retirement
age. The Austrian pension reforms implemented a gradual increase of the early retirement
age (ERA): Between the years 2000 and 2010, the ERA was increased from age 60 to 62
for males and from age 55 to 58.25 for females.3
Our study has three main objectives. First, we study to which extent the increase in
the ERA turned out to be an effective tool to increase employment of older workers. A se-
ries of previous studies that investigate the relationship between social security provisions
and retirement have documented a sharp increase in retirement rates at the age of first
1Between 1970 and 2010 the average life expectancy at age 65 in OECD countries increased by roughly
4 years for men and 5 years for women. Over the same period the average retirement age has declined
by almost one year. Forecasts suggest that there will be a further increase in life expectancy of around 3
years between 2010 and 2050 (OECD, 2011). The OECD projects that these forces will increase pension
expenditures from 9.2 percent of GDP in 2007 to 12.7 percent of GDP in 2060 (OECD, 2011).
2For a summary of the reforms implemented in the 1990s see Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999). More
recent reforms in industrialized countries are discussed in Gruber and Wise, eds (2007).
3Like in many other countries, Austrian retirement rules feature two statutory retirement ages: an ERA
and a normal retirement age (NRA). While individuals can claim retirement benefits at a reduced rate upon
reaching the ERA, they will only qualify for full retirement benefits at the NRA. The Austrian pension
reforms left the NRA unchanged at age 65 for males and age 60 for females.
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eligibility for retirement benefits (Gruber and Wise, eds, 2007). Given this empirical regu-
larity, an increase in the ERA is likely to be effective in delaying retirement and increasing
employment of older workers.
A second main objective of our analysis is to investigate the importance of spillover ef-
fects of the ERA-increase into other social insurance programs (in particular, unemployment
and disability insurance). For instance, previous studies have found that unemployment
and/or disability insurance payrolls are often used as a gateway to early retirement. In
many countries, enrollment in these programs has increased substantially in recent years
and they have become an important channel by which workers drop permanently out of
the work force.4 Understanding how a rise in the ERA affects inflow into other programs
is also important to assess the consequences for government expenditures.
A third main objective of our analysis is therefore to explore the fiscal consequences
(i.e. net reduction of government expenditures) of the increase in the ERA as well as its
distributive implications (i.e. which types of workers contribute how much to the expendi-
ture reduction). More precisely, we estimate the fiscal implications by translating the labor
market effects into corresponding changes in overall retirement benefit payments, social
security contributions and earnings taxes as well as changes in overall unemployment and
disability benefit payments. Since the ERA-increase affected high- and low-wage workers
differently, it is important to account for these heterogenous effects to correctly estimate
the fiscal consequences. At the same time, accounting for effect-heterogeneity also allows
us to study in detail the distributive consequences of the ERA-increase and to explore the
extent to which the burden of the ERA-increase is indeed carried by low-wage workers in
bad health.
We think that understanding the consequences of the pension reforms in Austria is of
general interest for at least three reasons. First, the institutional features of the Austrian
old-age social security, while differing in the details, share many features in other coun-
tries. In many public pension systems there is both an ERA and a NRA. Many countries
allow older workers to permanently retire through unemployment insurance and disability
insurance, often providing preferential treatment for older workers. Hence, we think that
evaluating the Austrian pension reform will contribute to a better understanding of pen-
4For a review, see Autor and Duggan (2006) and Wise, ed (2012).
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sions reforms also in other contexts. Second, the Austrian labor market is characterized by
a very low labor force participation of older workers. In 2009, only 42 percent of individuals
aged 55-64 were employed or looking for a job compared to an average of 57 percent in the
OECD countries. The low labor force participation rate of older individuals in Austria is
partly due to the low ERA but also due to the availability of alternative pathways into early
retirement. Since a quite large fraction of the labor force of older workers is inactive and
since the public pension system is quite generous, we expect the impact in the Austrian case
to be quite large (compared to countries where the older labor force is better utilized and
where the public pension system offers lower earning replacement rates). Austrian estimates
may thus serve as an upper bound for effects of ERA-increases on labor market behavior of
older workers. Finally, we can exploit the Austrian social security administration database
(ASSD) that covers the universe of all private sector workers. The ASSD does not only re-
port the complete employment- and earnings-history of these workers, it also informs about
take-up of other welfare benefits (such as unemployment and disability benefits). Hence, we
can study not only the labor market consequence but also the distributive effects of fiscal
adjustment of the ERA-increase in a clean way.
To identify the effect of the ERA on labor market behavior of older workers we exploit
the fact that the ERA-increase was phased in gradually implying that month-of-birth is the
key determinant for the age of first eligibility for retirement benefits. As the ASSD reports
the individuals' birth month, we can precisely determine each individual's ERA and hence
estimate the effects of the ERA-increase by comparing the labor market behavior of younger
birth cohorts to older birth cohorts who were not affected by the rise in the ERA.
Our empirical analysis yields the following results. First, we find (unsurprisingly) that
an increase in the ERA leads to a substantial delay in retirement. However, the delay
in retirement was not fully compensated by corresponding increases in employment. Our
estimates indicate that increasing the ERA by one year reduces retirement benefit claims
during that year by 18.9 percentage points among men and by 22.3 percentage points
among women. The drop in retirement benefit claims is accompanied by an increase in
employment of merely 6.8 percentage points among men and 10.1 percentage points among
women. While this latter result indicates positive and non-negligible employment effects, it
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also shows that an even larger share of workers (who had to delay their retirement), spent
this time in some form of non-employment.
Second, a closer look on take-up of welfare benefits shows that increasing the ERA causes
a substantial increase in registered unemployment, 10.1 percentage points among men and
women. The increase the percentage on disability benefits (and the percentage out-of-the-
labor-force) is comparably small in magnitude. Hence, the caveat that increasing the ERA
may lead to substantial spillovers to other welfare programs is quantitatively important in
the Austrian case.
Finally, we explore the fiscal and distributive consequences of increasing the ERA. We
do not find strong support for the claim that unhealthy low-wage workers bear most of
the costs of the ERA-increase. To the contrary, we find that more than two thirds of
the net reduction in government expenditures were generated by healthy individuals with
lifetime incomes above the median. Fiscal effects generated by unhealthy individuals are
small either because they retire through the disability system (the rules of which remained
unchanged) or because they bridged the gap to later retirement by drawing unemployment
benefits.
Our paper is related to an extensive literature studying how changes in benefit generosity
affect the timing of retirement (Burtless, 1986; Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Börsch-Supan
and Schnabel, 1998; Coile and Gruber, 2007; Liebman et al., 2009; Manoli and Weber,
2010). Those studies typically find that changes in retirement benefits have a significant
impact on the timing of retirement. In contrast, there is little work on how a rise in the
retirement age affects labor force participation.
Earlier studies have relied on out-of-sample predictions to estimate the labor supply
response to changes in the ERA and NRA and typically find that a raise in the retirement
age leads to a sizeable increase in labor force participation of older workers (Rust and
Phelan, 1997; Panis et al., 2002; Gruber and Wise, eds, 2004). More recently, Mastrobuoni
(2009) exploits a policy change in the U.S. that increased the NRA from 65 to 67 and raised
the penalty for claiming retirement benefits before the NRA. He concludes that an increase
in the NRA by 2 months delays effective retirement by around 1 month. This estimate is
much larger than the effect suggested by the previous simulation studies, possibly because
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the out-of-sample projections omit factors that are important for the timing of retirement
such as social custom or liquidity constraints.
Our paper estimates the labor supply response of an increase in the ERA as opposed to
the NRA. This distinction is important for two reasons. First, an increase in the ERA forces
individuals to claim retirement benefits later (or seek benefits from other sources) while an
increase in the NRA is equivalent to a reduction in benefits. Second, the documented peak
in the age distribution at retirement is typically more pronounced at the ERA as opposed
to the NRA (Gruber and Wise, eds, 1999). Therefore, a rise in the ERA is likely to be a
more effective measure to increase labor force participation among older workers as opposed
to a rise in the NRA.
This paper also builds on a growing literature that explores how changes in the gen-
erosity of one social insurance program affects enrollment in other programs. Most of these
studies focus on spillover effects of changes in the disability insurance (Autor and Duggan,
2003; Karlström et al., 2008; Borghans et al., 2010; Staubli, 2011) or unemployment in-
surance (Bloemen et al., 2011; Inderbitzin et al., 2011). The most closely related paper is
Duggan et al. (2007) who study the same policy change as Mastrobuoni (2009) and find
that the increased penalty for claiming retirement benefits before the NRA led to more
disability insurance enrollment prior to the NRA. Our findings suggest that the increase
in the ERA had a relatively small effect on disability recipiency. Instead we find that a
significant fraction of affected individuals responded to the increase in the ERA by claiming
unemployment benefits or staying in employment longer.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes Austria's social insurance programs
and the policy changes in the public pension system. Section 3 summarizes the data and
presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 outlines the identification strategy. Section 5
presents the empirical results. Section 6 explores the implications of the reforms on net
government expenditures. Section 7 draws conclusions.
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2 Background
2.1 The Public Pension System in Austria
The Austrian pension system covers almost all workers in Austria and provides early re-
tirement pensions, old age pensions, and disability pensions. All pensions are subject to
income taxation and mandatory health insurance contributions. Early retirement and old
age pensions are the main source of retirement income and replace on average 80 percent
of the most recent gross wage up to maximum of approximately 2,900 euros per month.
Conditional on having 35 contribution years or 37.5 insurance years, early retirement pen-
sions can be claimed at any age after 60 for men and 55 for women, though at a reduced
rate. Insurance years comprise both contributing years (periods of employment, including
sickness, and maternity leave) and qualifying years (periods of unemployment, military ser-
vice, or secondary education). Old age pensions can be claimed at the NRA of 65 for men
and 60 for women as long as the individual has 15 insurance years in the last 30 years or
15 contribution years.
The level of early retirement and old age pensions depends on the assessment basis and
the pension coefficient. The assessment basis corresponds to the average earnings over the
best 15 years after applying a cap to earnings in each year. The pension coefficient is the
percentage of the assessment basis that is received in the pension. The pension coefficient
increases with the number of insurance years up to a maximum of 80 percent (roughly 45
insurance years). Since 1996 there is a penalty for claiming benefits before the NRA and a
bonus for retirement after the NRA of approximately 2 percentage points per year.
To be eligible for disability pensions, applicants must suffer a health impairment that
will last for at least 6 months and must have accumulated at least 5 insurance years. Because
medical criteria for disability classification are relaxed starting at age 57, disability pensions
have played an important role in early retirement (Staubli, 2011). More specifically, below
that age threshold, an individual is generally considered disabled if the capacity to work
is reduced by more than 50 percent in any occupation in the economy. Above the age
threshold of 57 the same individual qualifies for benefits if the work capacity is reduced by
50 percent in the same occupation. Because men first become eligible for early retirement
pensions at age 60 as opposed to 55 for women, disability enrollment is disproportionately
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high among older men. In 2010, for example, 66 percent of new male recipients and 30
percent of new female recipients were older than 57. The calculation of disability pensions
is identical to that of early retirement and old age pensions, except for a special increment
that is granted to applicants below age 57.
In January 2000 the Austrian government introduced a partial retirement scheme, al-
lowing for a gradual transition from work to retirement. Conditional on having worked for
15 years in the past 25 years, male workers older than 55 and female workers older than 50
can reduce their working time to 40-60 percent of their previous work hours for a maximum
period of five years while their earnings are only reduced to 70-80 percent. The scheme
provides a great flexibility in scheduling work hours. In particular, workers are allowed to
block their work hours within the agreed period. For example, a male worker who agreed
to reduce his work hours by 50 percent can choose to work full time during the first 2.5
years of the program and effectively retire at age 57.5.
Unemployment benefits are not taxed and replace around 55 percent of the last net
wage. Depending on the previous work history, unemployment benefits can be claimed for
up to one year. Individuals who exhaust their regular unemployment benefits may apply
for unemployment assistance. These means-tested transfers last for successive periods of
39 weeks after which eligibility requirement are recurrently checked and can be at most 92
percent of regular unemployment benefits. Unemployment insurance plays an important
role in the transition to early retirement in Austria. Many older workers stop working before
the eligibility age for an early retirement pension and bridge the gap via unemployment
insurance benefits.
2.2 The 2000 and 2003 Pension Reforms
To improve the fiscal health of the public pension system, the Austrian government enacted
the 2000 pension reform on October 1st 2000. The reform was debated in Parliament in
June 2000 and approved at the beginning of July. The most important change was an
increase in the eligibility age for early retirement pensions by 1.5 years for men and women.
This increase was phased-in gradually over time. More specifically, each quarter of birth
the eligibility age was raised by 2 months for men born after September 1940 and women
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born after September 1945 until reaching 61.5 for men born after September 1942 and 56.5
for women born after September 1947. Men with at least 45 insurance years (around 15% of
60-61.5 year old men) and women with at least 40 insurance years (around 10% of 55-56.5
year old women) were unaffected by the increase in the eligibility age.
Along with this change, the Austrian government temporarily extended the maximum
duration of unemployment benefits from 1 to 1.5 years. The extension of unemployment
benefit was limited to a small group of people. Only men born between 1940 and 1942 and
women born between 1945 and 1947 who had worked at least 15 years in the past 25 years
and were unemployed in July 2000 or became unemployed after July 2000 were eligible. The
benefit extension was in effect until December 2002. The reform also increased the penalties
for retirement before the NRA and the bonus for retirement after the NRA. Specifically,
before the reform each year of retirement prior to the NRA reduced the pension coefficient
by 2 percentage points. After the reform this number was increased to 3 percentage points.
The 2000 reform also extended the maximal duration of the partial retirement scheme from
5 to 6.5 years. This increase allowed for a smooth transition from partial retirement to
regular retirement while leaving the minimum age to enter the partial retirement scheme
unchanged at 55 for men and 50 for women.
In June 2003 the Austrian government enacted the 2003 pension reform, which became
effective on January 1, 2004. The reform continued the increase in the eligibility age for
early retirement pensions from 61.5 to 65 for men and from 56.5 to 60 for women. This
increase was phased in gradually and occurred in two main stages. Each quarter of birth
the eligibility age increased by two months for men born between January and June 1943
and women born between January and June 1948, followed by one-month increments per
quarter of birth for men born between July 1943 and December 1952 and women born
between July 1948 and December 1957. As for the 2000 pension reform, men with at least
45 insurance years and women with at least 40 insurance years were unaffected by the
increase in the eligibility age for early retirement pensions.
The reform also reduced the generosity of benefits by lowering the pension coefficient
and increasing the penalty for claiming a pension prior to the NRA. Specifically, before the
reform each insurance year replaced 2 percent of the assessment basis. After the reform this
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number was lowered to 1.88 percent. Moreover, the reform changed the assessment basis
from the best 15 years to the best 40 years. This extension is being phased-in between
2004 and 2028 and will decrease pension benefits, because the calculation of the assessment
basis includes also years with low wages. Unlike the 2000 pension reform, there was no
temporary extension of unemployment benefits.
Because the 2003 pension reform will eliminate the possibility to claim retirement ben-
efits prior to the NRA, the Austrian government introduced the "corridor pension" on
January 1, 2005. This pension is comparable to an early retirement pension and can be
claimed between the ages of 62 and 65, conditional on having 37.5 insurance years. (It
essential allows early retirement at age 62, even when the regular ERA is higher.) Since
the female NRA will be gradually increased from 60 to 65 beginning of 2024, for women
the corridor pension will only be relevant after 2028. Until then, women can still claim an
old age pension prior to age 62.
Figure 1
Figure 1 summarizes the changes in the ERA for men born in January 1940 to September
1947 (left panel) and for women born in January 1945 to September 1952 (right panel). For
these birth cohorts the eligibility age for an early retirement pension was increased between
2000 and 2010, which is the time period covered by our data. For older birth cohorts
the eligibility age for an early retirement pension was increased in two-month increments,
followed by one-month increments for younger birth cohorts. Over this time period the
ERA for women was raised by a total of 39 months (3.25 years). Due to the introduction
of the corridor pension, the increase in the ERA for men was 24 months (2 years).
The consequences of the increase in the ERA are seen in Figure 2, which plots the
age distribution of retirement entry of men (left panel) and women (right panel) in 2000
and 2010. As the Figure illustrates, in 2000 retirement entry peaked at age 60 for women
and age 55 for women. In 2010, the inflow rate for men at age 60 declined by almost 20
percentage points and increased by roughly 15 percentage points at age 62. There are also
smaller increases in the inflow rate at ages 63 and older. For women retirement entry at
age 55 declined by roughly 35 percentage points in 2010 compared to 2000 and increased
by more than 10 percentage points at age 58.
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Figure 2
3 Data and Descriptives
To examine the impact of the increase in the ERA on labor market behavior, we use data
from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which is described in Zweimüller et al.
(2009). The data contain very detailed longitudinal information dating back to 1972 for all
private sector workers in Austria. For all individuals who have retired by the end of 2010,
information on insurance relevant states is available for the years prior to 1972. At the
individual level the data include gender, nationality, month and year of birth, blue-collar
or white-collar status, labor market history, earnings and individual identifiers. The data
contain several firm-specific variables: geographical location, industry affiliation and firm
identifiers (from 1972 onward) that allow us to link both individuals and firms.
Our main sample consists of all men aged 60-62.25 with less than 45 insurance years and
women aged 55-58.5 with less than 40 insurance years over the period 1996 to 2010 (men
born in January 1935 to September 1950 and women born in October 1938 to September
1955). Given the introduction of the partial retirement scheme in January 2000 with the
potential to affect labor market behavior, the analysis focuses primarily on the years 2000
to 2010. The sample restrictions are as follows. From the initial sample of 496,170 men
and 520,486 women, we exclude 77,802 men with more than 45 insurance years and 43,954
women with more than 40 insurance years. We also exclude 18,222 men and 14,840 women
who spent any time as civil servants, as they are covered by a separate pension system with
different eligibility rules. We also exclude 28,924 men and 22,966 women who have spent
any time working in jobs defined as heavy labor, as they might be eligible for a special
heavy labor pension. The final sample thus comprises 371,222 men and 438,726 women.
Individuals are observed on the 1st of January, 1st of April, 1st of July, and 1st of
October in each year. Due to the phase-in of the 2000 and 2003 policy changes, the age at
which someone can claim retirement benefits is a function of the month and year of birth.
Since this information is contained in the data, we can determine exactly who is eligible
for retirement benefits in a given quarter. The earliest start date for retirement benefits is
the first of the month after reaching the ERA. For example, individuals who start claiming
11
retirement benefits on October 1, 2000, have reached the ERA in September 2000 or earlier.
Tables 1 presents summary statistics by year for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged
55-58.5. As shown in Panel A, from 2000 to 2010 there have been dramatic changes in
the fraction of men and women in different labor market states. Over this time period
the share of individuals claiming retirement benefits decreased from 34.2 to 10.2 percent
among men and from 49.4 to 7.2 percent among women. This decline was accompanied
by a significant rise in employment from 8 to 29.5 percent among men and from 26 to
56.1 percent among women. However, there is also evidence that the rise in the ERA
increased registered unemployment.5 From 2000 to 2010 the unemployment rate rose by
7.5 percentage points among men and 6.2 percentage points among women. Similarly,
there is 3.2-4.4 percentage points increase in the share of individuals who are not in the
labor force. Over the same period disability enrollment declined among men and remained
roughly constant among women, perhaps reflecting the impact of the reduction in the
generosity of disability and retirement benefits that was part of the 2000 and 2003 policy
reforms. The share of individuals in the partial retirement program is very low and has
increased by only 0.5 percentage points from 2000 to 2010.
Panel B shows the characteristics of our sample in 2000 and 2010. Both for men and
women there are only minor differences in observable characteristics between these two
years. Women are less likely to work in blue-collar occupations and tend to have more sick
leave days than men. They also tend to have less work experience and less insurance years
than their male counterparts. These differences largely arise because women in our sample
are on average five years younger than men. Finally, the last two rows of Panel B show
that annual and average earnings of women are roughly one third below annual and average
earnings of men.
Table 1
To illustrate the impact of the increase in the ERA graphically, Figure 3 plots trends in
retirement, employment, and other states (defined as not being employed or retired) over
time among men aged 60-62 and women aged 55-58.25. As Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates,
5Unemployment is defined here as being registered at an unemployment office, without necessarily re-
ceiving regular unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance.
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in the years before the 2000 reform became effective approximately 35 percent of men and
50 percent of women claimed retirement benefits. The fraction is higher among women
because many men already withdraw from the labor market before age 60 by applying for
disability benefits. After 2000 the fraction of retired men aged 60-62 decreased by almost
30 percentage points up to 2005 and then stays fairly constant. In 2005 the corridor pension
was introduced, which allowed men to permanently retire at age 62. Similarly, there is a 45
percentage points decline in the share of 55-58.25 year old women in retirement. The figure
also illustrates that in 2010 small share of men and women still claim retirement benefits
prior to the new ERA of 62 for men and 58.25 for women, which is most likely due to some
measurement error in the calculation of insurance years.
Figure 3
The drop in retirement benefit claiming was accompanied by a large increase in employ-
ment of 20 percentage points among men and 30 percentage points among women (Panel
B of Figure 3).6 As Panel C of Figure 3 shows, evidence for the other states is mixed.
To explore the labor market effect further, Figure 4 groups the category other states into
the subcategories unemployment, disability, and not in the labor force. Panel A of Figure
4 shows that after 2000 there is a substantial increase in the unemployment rate, while
disability enrollment declined among men and stayed fairly constant among women (Panel
B of Figure 4). As Panel C of Figure 4 illustrates, there is also an increase in the fraction
of individuals not in the labor force. Of course, part of the documented trends in Figures
3 and 4 could simply reflect the impact of changes that are unrelated to the increase in the
ERA. To separate the impact of the increase in the ERA from macroeconomic and other
common factors, we compare labor market trends of younger and older birth cohorts over
time, as outlined in the next section.
Figure 4
6Employment as it is defined here also includes individuals enrolled into the partial retirement program.




The goal of the 2000 and 2003 reforms was to foster employment among older workers
by increasing the ERA. While access to retirement benefits became stricter as a result
of this increase, eligibility criteria for unemployment, partial retirement, and disability
benefits remained the same. Therefore, it is plausible that some individuals who would
have otherwise claimed retirement benefits responded to this change by seeking benefits
from other social insurance programs. Such a change in behavior would diminish the positive
effect of these reforms on employment.
Because the increase in retirement age was phased-in gradually, the age at which an
individual could claim retirement benefits depended on the month of birth. For example,
men born before October 1940 could claim benefits at age 60 while those born in October
to December 1940 had to wait 2 months longer before they became eligible for benefits. As
illustrated in Figure 1, there are similar discontinuities in the ERA for other birth cohorts
and for women. On this basis, the primary approach to estimate the effect of the rise in
the retirement age compares the labor market behavior of younger birth cohorts to older
birth cohorts who were not affected by the increase in the ERA.
This comparison can be implemented by estimating regressions of the following type:
yit = α+ θi + λt +X
′
itβ + γ Belowit + εit (1)
where i denotes individual, t quarter, and yit is the outcome variable of interest; θi are
age fixed effects (where age is measured in months) to control for age-specific trends in
labor market behavior; λt is a set of quarter fixed effects to capture common time shocks
in labor market behavior; and Xit represents individual or region specific characteristics to
control for any observable differences that might confound the analysis (blue-collar status,
experience, insurance years, sick days, previous annual earnings, average earnings over the
best 15 years, industry dummies, region dummies, and a fourth-order polynomial in birth-
month to control for cohort-varying outcome characteristics).
The key explanatory variable is Below, which is equal to one if an individual's age in
quarter t is below the ERA, and zero otherwise. For example, because the first increase in
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the ERA occurred in the forth quarter of 2000, Below is zero for all individuals on January
1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, 2000. On January 1, 2001, Below is one for men below
age 60.17 born in October to December 1940 and women below age 55.17 born October to
December 1945, because for these birth cohorts the ERA was increased by 2 months in the
forth quarter of 2000.
The identifying assumption is that, absent the increase in the ERA, the change in yit
would have been comparable between age groups not yet eligible for retirement benefits
(treatment group) and those eligible (comparison group) after controlling for background
characteristics. Under this assumption, γ measures the average causal effect of an increase
in the ERA on yit, using variation over time. Equation (1) is estimated separately for
men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 using data for the period 2000 to 2010. The
advantage of focusing on a small age range is that individuals who are not affected by the
increase in the retirement age are close substitutes to those affected. Thus, trends in labor
market behavior across age groups are likely to be similar. As a placebo test, we estimate
equation (1) for the period 1996 to 2000 assuming that the increase in the ERA started in
the forth quarter of 1996; during this time period the ERA remained effectively unchanged,
and so we expect γ to be zero.
Both the 2000 and 2003 pension reforms implemented other changes to the pension sys-
tem, in addition to the increase in the ERA. A potential concern of our empirical strategy is
that theses changes had a differential impact on the labor market behavior in the treatment
and comparison groups. Both the 2000 and 2003 pension reforms raised the penalty for
claiming retirement benefits before the NRA. The reduction in the pension coefficient was
relatively modest and is unlikely to have affected retirement behavior in the treatment and
comparison groups differently. For example, the 2000 pension reform reduced the retire-
ment benefits of a 62 year old men by 3 percentage points. The penalty implemented with
the 2003 reform was even smaller. To investigate the impact of the reduction in benefit
generosity, we re-estimate equation (1) with age-specific time trends, to allow treatment
and comparison age groups to follow different trends.
The 2000 pension reform also temporarily extended the duration of unemployment
benefits from 1 to 1.5 years for men born between 1940 and 1942 and women born between
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1945 and 1947 who had worked at least 15 years in the past 25 years. This extension may
affect the employment response if eligible individuals respond to the increase in the ERA
by seeking unemployment benefits instead of remaining in employment. However, since the
extension was limited to a small group of people and only effective for a short period of
time, it is unlikely to have a large effect on the estimates.
Figure 5
To illustrate the idea behind the identification strategy graphically, Figure 5 plots trends
in retirement, employment, and other states for men between the ages 58 and 64 by birth
cohort. The vertical lines represent the cohort-specific ERA as implemented by the 2000 and
2003 policy changes. As shown in Panel A, the fraction of men who claim retirement benefits
increases by 20 to 25 percentage points at the ERA. The increase in retirement benefits
claiming at the ERA is accompanied by a drop in employment of 10 percentage points.
Similarly, the fraction of men enrolled in other states declines by almost 15 percentage
points at the ERA. However, for younger birth cohorts the declines in employment and
enrollment in other states occur later in life due to the increase in the ERA.
Figure 6
Figure 6 shows trends for three subcategories of other states (unemployment, disability,
and not in the labor force) by age for men born in different months. Panel A shows that
a sizeable share of men is unemployed before claiming retirement benefits. Because of the
increase in the ERA, younger birth cohorts tend to stay unemployed longer than older birth
cohorts. On the other hand, as Panel B illustrates, the increase in the ERA had little effect
on disability enrollment. Similarly, the fraction of individuals not in the labor force differs
only slightly across birth cohorts, as shown in Panel C.
Figure 7
Figures 7 and 8 present labor market trends for women between the ages 53 and 59 by
birth cohort. As shown in Panel A of Figure 7, the fraction of women claiming retirement
benefits rises by around 30 percent at the ERA, although the effect is somewhat smaller for
the youngest birth cohort. Panel B of Figure 7 suggests that a significant share of women
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responded to the policy change by staying in employment as for younger birth cohorts the
drop in employment occurs at a later age. As for men, Panel A of Figure 8 shows that due
to the increase in the ERA, younger birth cohorts tend to stay unemployed longer than
older birth cohorts. On the other hand, the increase in the ERA had virtually no effect on
the probability of receiving disability benefits (Panel B of Figure 8) or on the probability
of being out of the labor force (Panel C of Figure 8). These figures are consistent with
the hypothesis that the rise in the ERA increased employment among men and women,
but had also important spillover effects into other social insurance programs, primarily the
unemployment insurance. In the next section, we quantify the magnitude of these effects
by using the model in equation (1).
Figure 8
5 Effects of the ERA-increase on labor market behavior
We are now ready to present our empirical results on the impact of the ERA increase on
labor market behavior. We proceed in two steps. We first focus on the impact on retirement
and employment, treating all other states as residual category. We then proceed by a closer
focus on how the ERA-increase affected enrollment into other welfare state programs, in
particular take-up of unemployment and disability benefits.
5.1 Impact on Retirement and Employment
Table 2 present OLS estimates on the impact of the policy change on retirement benefits
claiming, employment, as well as other states of non-employment. The dependent variable
yit is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if an individual is in the state in question and 0 otherwise.
Columns 1 through 4 provide estimates of our key explanatory variable Below for men and
columns 5 through 8 display analogous results for women.
Column 1 of Panel A indicates that the increase in the ERA reduced retirement benefits
claiming among affected men by 20.76 percentage points, or 60.6 percent of the baseline
retirement rate of 60-62.25 year old men in 2000. Column 1 of Panel B shows that this
decline was accompanied by an increase in employment of 6.95 percentage points. The total
effect on employment is even larger, when partial retirement is included (column 1 of Panel
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C). At the same time, the share of affected men enrolled in other states increased by 12.33
percentage points, as illustrated in column 1 of Panel D.
Column 2 of Table 2 indicates that adding control variables to equation (2) has only
minor effects on the estimates. These estimates will be biased if the treatment and com-
parison groups have different labor supply tendencies. To shed light on this concern, we
add age-specific time trends to the baseline specification. The implied estimates are largely
insensitive to these additional controls, as illustrated in column 3 of Table 2. Column 4
shows estimates if we restrict attention to the period 1996 to 2000 assuming (incorrectly)
that the increase in the ERA started in the forth quarter of 1996. Although some coeffi-
cients are significant, the magnitude is small, suggesting that our estimation strategy is not
simply picking up long-run trends in differences across age groups.
Turning to the results for women, column 5 of Panel A demonstrates that the increase in
the ERA reduced retirement benefits claiming among affected women by 22.96 percentage
points. This decline amounts to 52.3 percent of the baseline retirement rate among 55-58.5
year old women in 2000. As shown in column 5 of Panel B, one direct consequence of the
decline in retirement benefits claiming was an increase in employment of 9.72 percentage
points. As for men, the increase in employment is larger when partial retirement is included
(column 5 of Panel C). Similarly, as illustrated in column 5 of Panel D, there is a 10.29
percentage points increase in the share of women enrolled in other states. The results are
very similar for the various specifications such as adding individual characteristics (column
6) and controlling for age-specific time trends (column 7). Column 8 presents estimates if
we restrict the sample to the period 1996 to 2000. Some coefficients are significant, but
they are all small in size.
Table 2
5.2 ERA-effects on other Welfare Programs
To explore the labor market effects of the increase in the ERA in more detail, we group in-
dividuals that are enrolled in other states in three subcategories (unemployment, disability,
and not in the labor force) and then estimate equation (1) for each subcategory separately
(Table 3). Columns 1 through 4 report coefficient estimates of our key explanatory variable
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Below for men and the next four columns display the analogous estimates for women.
Consistent with the graphical analysis, column 1 of Panel A shows that registered
unemployment increased by 10.5 percentage points among affected men. On the other hand,
the increase in the ERA had little impact on disability enrollment, as shown in Panel B. The
low disability response stands in contrast with Duggan et al. (2007) who find that the rise in
full retirement age in the U.S. significantly increased disability insurance enrollment. One
possible explanation for the low disability response is that applications for disability benefits
are screened more rigourously after the increase in the ERA. Therefore, disability enrollment
varies little even though individuals may be more likely to seek benefits.7 Column 1 of
Panel C indicates that this policy change increased the share of men that is not in the labor
force by 1.37 percentage points. Columns 2 and 3 show that these results are very robust
to different specifications. Column 4 illustrates that the coefficient estimates are largely
insignificant if we restrict the sample to the time period 1996 to 2000.
Turning to the results for women, column 5 of Panel A illustrates that, as for men, the
rise in the ERA led to a substantial increase in registered unemployment of 8.46 percentage
points and had virtually no effect on disability enrollment (column 5 of Panel B). This
policy change also led to a small increase the share of women who are not in the labor
force, as column 5 of Panel C demonstrates. Adding control variables leads to a larger
estimate of the increase in the ERA on registered unemployment (columns 6 and 7 of Panel
A). As for men, column 8 illustrates that the estimates are small in size and insignificant if
we restrict attention to the period 1996 to 2000 and assume that the increase in the ERA
started in the forth quarter of 1996.
Table 3
The effects shown in Tables 2 and 3 can result either from changes in the inflow into
a certain state, or changes in the persistence in a certain state, or both. To shed light
on the importance of these two effects, Table 4 reports estimates from equation (1) for
transitions from and persistence in employment and unemployment. We focus on these two
states because they were affected most by the increase in the ERA. Column 1 of Panel A
7It is impossible to examine the reforms' impact on applications for disability benefits because this
information is not recorded in the data.
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suggests that among men the increase in the ERA reduced direct exits from employment
into retirement by 20.69 percentage points. This decline was almost entirely compensated
by a one to one increase in employment persistence, as illustrated in column 2 of Panel
A. On the other hand, columns 3 to 6 of Panel A indicate that this policy change had
only minor effects on transitions from employment into unemployment, disability, partial
retirement, or out of labor force. Panel B summarizes the results for transitions from and
persistence in unemployment among men. As column 1 of Panel B demonstrates, there is a
sizeable decline in transitions from unemployment to retirement by 74.23 percentage points.
As in the case of employment, the decline in retirement benefits claiming was absorbed by
an increase in unemployment persistence (column 3 of Panel B), while leaving transitions
to other exit states largely unaffected.
The analogous estimates for women are summarized in Panels C and D of Table 4. The
estimated decline in transitions from employment to retirement of 8.5 percentage points
summarized in column 1 of Panel C is half as large as the corresponding estimate for men.
As for men, the rise in the ERA increased persistence in employment by 7.81 percentage
points but had no effect on transitions to other states. The estimates in Panel D illustrate
that the increase in the ERA reduced the probability of a transition form unemployment
to retirement (column 1) and increased the persistence in unemployment (column 3).
Table 4
Because disutility of work may increase over age, it is instructive to examine how the
effect of this policy change varies by age. This analysis can be implemented by interacting
Below with a series of indicators for whether an individual's age is in a certain range. OLS
estimates of equation 1 for different age groups are provided in Table 5.
Columns (1) and (4) show that this policy change was much more effective in reducing
retirement benefits claiming at younger ages compared to older ages. One possible explana-
tion is that if the ERA is higher, individuals have more time to accumulate insurance years.
Thus, individuals are more likely to be exempted from the increase in the ERA. Columns
(2) illustrates that the rise in the ERA increased male employment in all age groups, but
the magnitude is almost twice as large for the youngest age group compared to the oldest
age group. A similar age pattern can be observed for female employment, although the
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difference between the youngest and the oldest age group is less pronounced than for men.
The estimates in columns (3) and (6) illustrate that approximately 50 percent of the de-
cline in retirement was compensated by an increase in registered unemployment, although
in absolute terms the effect is larger for younger ages compared to older ages. The increase
in the ERA from 60 to 61.5 for men and from 55 to 56.5 for women was accompanied by
a temporary extension of unemployment benefits from 1 to 1.5 years. The constant rel-
ative increase in registered unemployment across age groups suggests that the temporary
extension of unemployment benefits had a negligible impact on behavior.
Table 5
6 The Distributive Implications of the ERA-increase
In this section we study the distributional consequences of the Austrian pension reform.
We first look whether and to what extent workers' responses to an increase in the ERA are
heterogenous. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity across individuals that are of par-
ticular interest in the present context: health and income. Intuitively, we do not only want
to know whether high- or low-wage workers contributed most to the net savings on social
security expenditures but also whether the healthy individuals are more strongly affected
than the less healthy. We then translate the estimated effects into changes in government
expenditures (taking account of increases in taxes and social security contributions for those
workers that stay longer in employment and of increase in transfers other than retirement
benefits for those who enter some other welfare program).
6.1 Heterogeneity in ERA-effects
Previous studies have documented that health (e.g., Rust and Phelan, 1997; Blau and
Gilleskie, 2001) and past earnings (e.g. Bound et al., 2010) are important determinants of
the retirement decision. To examine how these factors interact with the policy changes,
Table 6 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) by health and lifetime earnings for men.
Table 7 reports analogous estimates for women. Lifetime earnings here are measured by
the average earnings of the best 15 years. Health is measured by the time spent in sick
leave prior to age 54. An individual is considered healthy if the time spent on sick leave
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prior to age 54 is below the median. Individuals with sick leave days above the median are
defined as unhealthy.
Interestingly, as shown in Table 6, among men the decline in retirement is more pro-
nounced for the healthy. Moreover, healthy individuals react more strongly to the ERA-
increase the higher their lifetime income. Among those in the fourth quartile of the lifetime
earnings distribution, the ERA-increase reduces retirement benefit claims by as much as
31.9 percentage points compared to only 17.4 percentage points among those in the first
quartile. The income gradient of the ERA effect is flatter among the unhealthy, although
also among them the strongest impact is among those with the highest lifetime income.
Similarly, the ERA-effect on employment is stronger among the healthy and stronger for
high-wage workers than for low-wage workers.
The situation is somewhat different for women (Table 7). On the one hand, there is
a positive income-gradient of the ERA-effects, i.e. high-wage females react more strongly
to the ERA-increase than low-wage females. On the other hand, less healthy women delay
their retirement more strongly than the more healthy. Why does the health-gradient differ
between females and males? The difference is attributable to disability pension rules. Both
males and females have relaxed access to disability benefits at age 57. Due to this rule men
but not women have the relaxed access to disability benefits prior to the ERA (recall that
the ERA of females is 5 years lower than the one for males). While many less healthy males
have already left the labor force before the ERA through relaxed access disability benefits,
many less healthy females have to stay in the labor force because relaxed disability benefits
are not yet available to them. Notice also the differential ERA-effects on employment and
unemployment between healthy and unhealthy females. Comparing the relative size of
retirement coefficient (Panel A) to employment and unemployment coefficients (Panels B
and C) reveals that delaying retirement is associated with longer employment for roughly
60 percent (ratio of employment to retirement coefficient in columns 1-4) and additional
unemployment for roughly 25 percent (ratio of unemployment to retirement coefficients
in columns 1-4). The corresponding ratios for the unhealthy are quite different: longer





The primary objective of the 2000 and 2003 pension reforms was to reduce expenditures
of the public pension system by fostering labor force participation among older workers.
The reforms effectively increased the ERA between 2000 and 2010 by 2 years among men
and by 3.25 years among women. The results of the empirical analysis presented in the
previous sections suggest that the reforms succeeded in reducing retirement inflow. How-
ever, delayed retirement did not lead to a one-for-one increase in employment. Instead, we
find considerable spillover effects to unemployment insurance benefit claims and, to a lesser
extent, to the disability insurance program.
Based on the above estimation results we can provide a rough estimate how the ERA-
increase affected net government expenditures (see Table 8. The change in the number
of individuals in different states is based on the estimates in Tables 6 and 7 that account
for heterogeneity in ERA-effects by lifetime income and health status prior to the ERA-
increase.
Our thought experiment is as follows. We quantify the yearly fiscal effects (effects on
the government budget) by comparing males aged 60-62 in the pre-reform situation (when
the ERA was age 60) to the post-reform situation (when the ERA had increased to age 62;
and similarly for women aged 55-58.25. According to Panel A of Table 6 the share of 60-62
year old men in retirement decreases by 17.4 percentage points for healthy workers in the
first quartile of the lifetime income distribution, 20.5 percentage points for healthy workers
in the second quartile of the lifetime income distribution, and so on. We then multiply
these estimates with the average number of workers aged 60-62 in the various cells of
the health/lifetime-income matrix; and with the average retirement benefits, income taxes
and social security contributions, unemployment benefits and disability benefits for each
cell in the matrix. This lets us calculate the absolute change in the number of workers in
retirement, in employment, and on unemployment and disability benefits and the associated
changes in government-expenditures and -revenues. For simplicity, our calculation assumes
that other states of non-employment do not affect government expenditures.8
8Note that our calculation overestimates the absolute size of the reduction in government expenditures
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In Table 8 we show the overall fiscal implication of the ERA increase. The first column
of Table 8 presents a hypothetical estimate for net government savings assuming that all
reduction in early retirement claims were accompanied by the same increase in employment
(i.e. assuming the complete absence of any spillover effects to other welfare programs).
We find that the Austrian government would have saved 264 million Euros per year, if the
observed reduction in early retirement claims would have be accompanied by a correspond-
ing increase in employment without any spillover effects to other welfare programs. This
estimate is equivalent to a reduction of 54.8% in net government expenditures on 60-62 year
old men and 55-58.25 year old women (using pre-reform expenditures as the baseline).
How much of this hypothetical reduction in government expenditures does actually
materialize? The remaining columns of Table 8 estimates the actual reduction in net
government expenditures taking spillover effects into account. It estimates the impact of (i)
the fiscal savings due to lower retirement benefit payments (second column); (ii) the increase
in government revenues due to additional social security contributions and direct taxes paid
by those who remain longer in employment (third column); (iii) higher government outlays
for unemployment and disability insurance (fourth column). The final column reports the
net change government expenditures, i.e. the overall fiscal impact of the ERA-increase. We
find that the ERA-increase reduced retirement benefits payments by 157.5 million Euros;
increased government revenues by 47.2 million Euros; and increased unemployment and
disability benefit payments by 56.8 million Euros. In sum, the government saved 147.9
millions Euros or 30.1% of pre-reform net government expenditures on 60-62 year old men
and 55-58.25 year old women. This shows that spillover effects are huge. Put differently,
about 44 percent of potential government savings get lost due to spillovers effects.
Interestingly, more than 50 percent of the fiscal effect is generated by women. This is
due to 2 reasons. First, women react more strongly to the ERA increase than men. And
second, the number of affected women is larger because the relevant age-window where
reactions take place is 3.25 years for women while it is only 2 years for men. Hence, despite
the fact that retirement benefits, earnings and unemployment and disability benefits are
lower for women, this is offset by the larger number of women who actually respond to the
as some individuals may have access to other transfers (such as social welfare benefits) that we do not
observe in our data. However, since the ERA-increase had a small impact on the share of individuals who
are not in the labor force, the resulting bias is small.
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ERA-increase.
Finally, we quantify the distributive implications of the ERA-increase. We focus on the
two interesting dimensions of heterogeneity: health status and lifetime income. Table 9
shows that, among men, 24.8 million or almost 40 percent of the fiscal impact is generated
by the healthy rich (row 4, column 5) and almost 60 percent are generated by healthy
males with lifetime income above the median. The contribution of unhealthy males is
comparably small. The picture is somewhat different for women. The bulk of fiscal savings is
generated by healthy workers with a lifetime income above the median (almost 50 percent).
However, also unhealthy women (those with a lifetime income above the median) also
generate substantial reductions in net government expenditures.
Table 8
In sum, Table 9 gives a mixed picture on the distributive consequences of the ERA-
increase. On the one hand, the healthy, high-wage workers contribute most to the net
reduction in government expenditures while than the less-healthy, low-wage workers are
much less affected. On the other hand, women contribute more to government savings
than men, despite the fact that they earn significantly less than men; and a larger share
of the burden of fiscal adjustment is carried by the less healthy women. Notice, however,
that the former effect is intended by the government, as an important part of the pension
reform (that will fully materialize in the future) is to equalize retirement rules for males




Relying on two policy changes in Austria, this paper analyzed the impact of an increase
in the ERA on the labor supply of older workers. Austria is characterized by a low labor
force participation of older workers. Only 42 percent of men and 29 percent of women aged
55-64 are employed or actively seeking for work. With the goal of fostering employment
and improving the fiscal health of the public pension system, in 2000 and 2003 the Austrian
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government implemented a series of changes to the public pension system. The most signifi-
cant change brought about by this legislation was a gradual increase in the early retirement
age from 55 to 58.25 for women and from 60 to 62 for men between 2000 and 2010.
Using data on the universe of Austrian private sector workers, our empirical analysis
suggests that an increase in the ERA has significantly delayed retirement. Specifically,
retirement probabilities fell by 18.9 percentage points for males aged 60-62; and by 22.3
percentage points for females aged 55-58.25. However, delayed retirement did not lead to a
one-for-one increase in employment. Employment probabilities increased by 6.8 percentage
points among men and by 10.1 percentage points among women. This suggests that among
100 workers who retire later, between 30 and 40 percent prolong their employment while
between 60 and 70 percent are in some form of non-employment. Among the latter group,
the majority draws unemployment benefits (unemployment probabilities increased by 10.1
percentage points for males and by 10.2 percentage points for females). The empirical
analysis also suggests that an increase in the ERA had only a small effect on disability
insurance claims.
Pensions reforms are hotly debated, not least because of their distributive consequences.
Our analysis has shown that the net reduction in government expenditures are to a dis-
proportionate extent generated by healthy individuals with incomes above the median. We
conclude that Austrian pension reforms had some favorable distributive implications by
letting high-wage and healthy workers carrying most of the burden of fiscal adjustment,
while leaving poorer and less healthy largely unaffected. However, the Austrian pension
reforms also lead to quite large spillover effects to unemployment insurance. Successful
future pension reforms need to combine delayed retirement with stronger work incentives
(for both firms and workers) to reduce spillover effects to other welfare programs and to
generate higher employment rates for workers close to retirement.
Public pension programs are large and growing in most industrialized countries. Under-
standing how changes in the program parameters affect labor supply is extremely important
for policy makers. One way to control the size and growth of public pension programs is
through an increase in the ERA. The estimates presented in this paper suggest that this
measure is effective in increasing employment, despite large absorption effects by the un-
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employment insurance. The Austrian labor market is characterized by relatively generous
unemployment among older workers. Thus, the large increase in unemployment due to the
ERA may partly reflect unfavorable labor market conditions among older workers. In a
more flexible labor market, such as the one in the U.S., increasing the ERA is likely to
generate a better ratio of employment and unemployment effects.
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Figure 1: Increase in the minimum retirement age by gender.






























Figure 2: Age distribution of retirement entry of men (panel A) and women (panel B) in
2000 and 2010.


















































Figure 3: Trends in retirement, employment, and other states over time among men aged
60-62 and women aged 55-58.25.
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Figure 4: Trends in unemployment, disability, and not in labor force over time among men
aged 60-62 and women aged 55-58.25.











































Figure 5: Trends in retirement, employment, and other states over age for men born in
different months.
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Figure 6: Trends in unemployment, disability, and not in labor force over age for men born
in different months.














































Figure 7: Trends in retirement, employment, and other states over age for women born in
different months.
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Figure 8: Trends in unemployment, disability, and not in labor force over age for women
born in different months.
Source: Own calculations, based on Austrian Social Security Data.
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Table 1: Sample statistics for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 by year
Men Women
2000 2010 2000 2010
A. Labor market states (%)
Retirement 34.3 10.2 49.4 7.2
Employment 8.0 29.5 26.0 56.1
Unemployment 0.9 8.4 4.1 10.3
Disability 55.8 47.1 14.9 15.9
Partial retirement 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5
Not in labor force 1.0 4.2 5.5 9.9
B. Background characteristics
Blue collar 0.572 0.565 0.420 0.415
Sick days 5.9 8.2 11.4 11.9
Experience 18.1 16.6 16.7 16.5
Insurance years 36.4 34.0 29.7 28.0
Annual earnings 29,482 29,830 20,923 22,064
Average earnings 30,955 33,152 21,074 22,803
Number of
observations 238,072 170,459 340,616 290,697
Notes: Experience denotes experience in the last 25 years, sick days is the sum of days spent in sick leave
in the last 2 years, and average earnings is the average annual earnings over the best 15 years. Annual
earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation.
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Table 2: Effects on retirement, employment, and other states
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -20.76*** -18.90*** -21.42*** 0.09 -22.96*** -22.32*** -22.40*** -0.36**
(0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16)
R2 0.136 0.211 0.212 0.206 0.241 0.331 0.331 0.253
Mean 34.25 34.25 34.25 43.90 49.44 49.44 49.44 53.02
B. Employed without partial retirement
Below 6.95*** 6.34*** 7.18*** -0.20* 9.72*** 9.15*** 8.29*** 0.38**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
R2 0.062 0.220 0.220 0.130 0.097 0.199 0.199 0.122
Mean 7.99 7.99 7.99 7.10 26.04 26.04 26.04 25.47
C. Employed
Below 8.43*** 6.81*** 7.89*** -0.20* 12.67*** 10.11*** 9.69*** 0.38**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)
R2 0.077 0.277 0.277 0.130 0.116 0.239 0.239 0.122
Mean 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.10 26.07 26.07 26.07 25.47
D. Other
Below 12.33*** 12.09*** 13.53*** 0.11 10.29*** 12.21*** 12.71*** -0.02
(0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
R2 0.011 0.313 0.313 0.285 0.016 0.260 0.260 0.212
Mean 57.75 57.75 57.75 49.00 24.50 24.50 24.50 21.51
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Age*time No No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Years 2000-2010 2000-2010 2000-2010 1996-2000 2000-2010 2000-2010 2000-2010 1996-2000
Obs. 2,225,431 2,225,431 2,225,431 940,723 3,343,723 3,343,723 3,343,723 1,785,552
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. Controls are experience and its square, blue-collar status, number of
insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick leave days in the
last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Columns (3) and (6) also
include age-specific time trends. Annual earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. Reported
means are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,
* = 10%.
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Table 3: Effects on unemployment, disability, and not in the labor force
Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Unemployed
Below 10.50*** 10.07*** 11.75*** 0.09* 8.46*** 10.18*** 10.37*** 0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
R2 0.035 0.098 0.099 0.040 0.019 0.105 0.105 0.040
Mean 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 4.09 4.09 4.09 3.28
B. Disabled
Below 0.46*** 0.93*** 0.58*** -0.06 -0.10 0.31*** 0.56*** -0.04
(0.13) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
R2 0.006 0.275 0.275 0.286 0.004 0.092 0.092 0.106
Mean 55.76 55.76 55.76 47.45 14.93 14.93 14.93 13.99
C. Not in labor force
Below 1.37*** 1.09*** 1.20*** 0.08* 1.93*** 1.71*** 1.77*** -0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.008 0.027 0.027 0.034 0.006 0.161 0.161 0.176
Mean 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.63 5.48 5.48 5.48 4.23
Controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Age*time No No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Years 2000-2010 2000-2010 2000-2010 1996-2000 2000-2010 2000-2010 2000-2010 1996-2000
Obs. 2,225,431 2,225,431 2,225,431 940,723 3,343,723 3,343,723 3,343,723 1,785,552
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. Controls are experience and its square, blue-collar status, number of
insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick leave days in the
last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Columns (3) and (6) also
include age-specific time trends. Annual earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. Reported
means are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%,
* = 10%.
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Table 4: Effect on transitions from employment and unemployment by gender
Status at t: Retired Employed Unemployed Disabled Not in
labor force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Men
A. Employed at t− 1
Below -20.69*** 19.05*** 1.96*** 0.31*** -0.64***
(0.25) (0.28) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
R2 0.121 0.100 0.026 0.015 0.040
Mean 21.77 74.17 1.05 0.82 2.18
Obs. 481,402
B. Unemployed at t− 1
Below -74.23*** 0.67*** 72.53*** -0.10 1.13***
(0.48) (0.16) (0.51) (0.11) (0.17)
R2 0.583 0.043 0.347 0.018 0.033
Mean 68.12 2.42 26.66 1.01 1.80
Obs. 162,973
Women
C. Employed at t− 1
Below -8.50*** 7.81*** 0.82*** -0.02 -0.11**
(0.08) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
R2 0.051 0.056 0.023 0.008 0.050
Mean 5.91 88.93 2.29 0.95 1.92
Obs. 1,479,000
D. Unemployed at t− 1
Below -38.60*** 0.07 37.57*** -0.00 0.96***
(0.27) (0.10) (0.32) (0.07) (0.13)
R2 0.279 0.052 0.120 0.015 0.032
Mean 30.44 5.93 57.03 2.16 4.44
Obs. 317,573
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls for experience and its square, blue-collar
status, number of insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick
leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Annual
earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. The time period is 2000-2010. Reported means
are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * =
10%.
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Table 5: Estimates for different ages
Men Women
Retired Employed Unemployed Retired Employed Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ages Ages
Below*60.5 -23.31*** 9.31*** 12.84*** Below*55.5 -25.52*** 9.54*** 12.95***
(0.32) (0.23) (0.17) (0.34) (0.34) (0.21)
Below*61 -22.30*** 8.61*** 11.56*** Below*56 -26.78*** 11.26*** 12.39***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.13) (0.25) (0.24) (0.17)
Below*61.5 -20.45*** 8.02*** 9.93*** Below*56.5 -26.43*** 12.51*** 11.27***
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14)
Below*62 -15.26*** 4.53*** 9.07*** Below*57 -22.13*** 10.15*** 10.40***
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
Below*57.5 -19.50*** 9.04*** 8.84***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
Below*58 -17.67*** 7.77*** 8.29***
(0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
R2 0.212 0.277 0.098 0.331 0.239 0.105
Obs. 2,225,431 2,225,431 2,225,431 3,343,723 3,343,723 3,343,723
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls for experience and its square, blue-collar
status, number of insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick
leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Annual
earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. The time period is 2000-2010. Reported means
are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * =
10%.
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Table 6: Estimates by health status and quartiles of life-time earnings for men
Healthy Unhealthy
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -17.39*** -20.54*** -27.49*** -31.93*** -12.76*** -11.73*** -12.23*** -16.43***
(0.38) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.38)
R2 0.171 0.199 0.233 0.359 0.140 0.164 0.180 0.205
Mean 31.45 41.29 47.24 61.56 17.05 20.15 24.56 30.13
B. Employed
Below 7.35*** 8.23*** 7.38*** 18.46*** 2.36*** 3.02*** 3.21*** 3.90***
(0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.40) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24)
R2 0.143 0.228 0.240 0.439 0.097 0.157 0.209 0.283
Mean 12.74 6.81 8.06 25.64 3.46 2.24 1.70 3.06
C. Unemployed
Below 8.40*** 10.81*** 15.93*** 10.44*** 9.10*** 7.79*** 7.76*** 10.36***
(0.27) (0.28) (0.32) (0.26) (0.28) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27)
R2 0.089 0.109 0.146 0.073 0.116 0.100 0.093 0.120
Mean 2.69 0.59 0.32 0.45 2.22 0.56 0.46 0.24
Obs. 278,973 279,598 279,099 280,113 276,428 277,049 276,801 277,370
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls for experience and its square, blue-collar
status, number of insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick
leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Annual
earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. The time period is 2000-2010. Reported means
are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * =
10%.
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Table 7: Estimates by health status and quartiles of life-time earnings for women
Healthy Unhealthy
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Retired
Below -9.99*** -17.05*** -22.68*** -23.29*** -17.52*** -24.76*** -29.50*** -33.89***
(0.29) (0.36) (0.39) (0.40) (0.35) (0.38) (0.41) (0.42)
R2 0.248 0.309 0.339 0.353 0.300 0.350 0.367 0.377
Mean 28.19 43.48 54.78 61.26 39.25 50.53 56.14 61.88
B. Employed
Below 5.89*** 9.92*** 14.84*** 15.76*** 5.62*** 7.21*** 9.92*** 11.18***
(0.33) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.28) (0.30) (0.33) (0.34)
R2 0.208 0.246 0.272 0.292 0.110 0.128 0.166 0.230
Mean 41.49 37.77 33.96 32.11 17.26 14.50 15.93 15.08
C. Unemployed
Below 2.71*** 5.92*** 6.70*** 6.31*** 9.43*** 14.46*** 16.80*** 19.44***
(0.22) (0.26) (0.24) (0.21) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
R2 0.053 0.061 0.065 0.059 0.108 0.127 0.132 0.148
Mean 6.01 5.09 3.02 1.21 6.72 5.22 3.56 1.92
Obs. 419,450 420,404 419,935 420,915 415,022 415,982 415,540 416,475
Notes: This Table displays coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered at the individual level. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100 and should
be interpreted as percentage points. All estimates include controls for experience and its square, blue-collar
status, number of insurance years, annual earnings, average earnings over the best 15 years, number of sick
leave days in the last 2 years, industry, region and a fourth-order polynomial in month of birth. Annual
earnings and average earnings are adjusted for inflation. The time period is 2000-2010. Reported means
are for men aged 60-62.25 and women aged 55-58.5 in 2000. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * =
10%.
Table 8: Effect on annual government net expenditures (in million euros)
Potential ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in
net expenditures retirement benefits tax revenues UI & DI benefits net expenditures
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B-C+D)
Men -124.1 -72.7 19.4 27.6 -64.5
Women -139.9 -84.8 27.8 29.2 -83.4
Total -264.0 -157.5 47.2 56.8 -147.9
(∆ in %) (-54.8%) (-49.8%) (55.5%) (22.7%) (-30.7%)
Notes: Notes: The first column represents the potential change in annual net expenditures if the reduction
in early retirement was entirely compensated by an increase in employment. The last column shows the
effective change in annual net expenditures, which is equal to the change in retirement benefits paid (column
B), the change in tax revenues received (column C), and the change in UI & DI benefits paid (column D).
All values are adjusted for inflation. ∆ in % measures the change relative to the year 2000. For more details
on the calculation see main text.
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Table 9: Effect on annual government net expenditures by subgroups (in million euros)
Potential ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in Effective ∆ in
net expenditures retirement benefits tax revenues UI & DI benefits net expenditures
(A) (B) (C) (D) (B-C+D)
A. Men
Healthy
1st quartile -7.6 -5.1 1.0 1.9 -4.2
2nd quartile -15.5 -9.5 2.3 3.6 -8.2
3rd quartile -27.8 -15.8 3.2 6.6 -12.4
4th quartile -39.3 -20.3 10.0 5.5 -24.8
Unhealthy
1st quartile -4.5 -3.4 0.2 1.7 -1.9
2nd quartile -6.2 -4.3 0.5 2.0 -2.8
3rd quartile -8.3 -5.4 0.8 2.3 -3.9
4th quartile -14.9 -8.9 1.4 4.0 -6.3
B. Women
Healthy
1st quartile -2.7 -2.0 0.4 0.5 -1.9
2nd quartile -9.8 -6.3 2.0 1.8 -6.5
3rd quartile -20.6 -11.9 5.7 2.9 -14.7
4th quartile -34.9 -17.7 11.6 3.9 -25.4
Unhealthy
1st quartile -5.0 -3.9 0.4 1.8 -2.5
2nd quartile -11.7 -8.5 0.9 3.8 -5.6
3rd quartile -19.6 -13.3 2.1 5.4 -10.0
4th quartile -35.6 -21.2 4.7 9.1 -16.8
Total -264 -157.5 47.2 56.8 -147.9
Notes: The first column represents the potential change in annual net expenditures if the reduction in early
retirement was entirely compensated by an increase in employment. The last column shows the effective
change in annual net expenditures, which is equal to the change in retirement benefits paid (column B),
the change in tax revenues received (column C), and the change in UI & DI benefits paid (column D). All
values are adjusted for inflation. For more details on the calculation see main text.
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